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25X1

## SUMMARY

## GENERAL

1. Soviet representative offers proposal for armament census (page 3).

## USSR

2. Comment on Bolshevik Revolution Anniversary speech (page 4).

25X1

## SOUTH ASIA

4. Comment on political developments in Kashmir (page 5).

25X1

## WESTERN EUROPE

6. Belgian and Dutch troop commitments for Korea not likely to be increased (page 7)

25X1

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25X1A

- 2 -

25X1A

## GENERAL

1. Soviet representative offers proposal for armament census:

25X1A




In an approach to a member of the US delegation to the UN General Assembly, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin suggested a US-Soviet meeting on outstanding issues. Specifically,

he maintained that the Soviet Union was prepared for an international armament census and inspection of arms production. Alleging that real international inspection was meant, Tsarapkin said it must be "based on abolition of the use of atomic weapons in warfare and on a limitation of conventional armaments."

Comment: Tsarapkin's remarks probably foreshadow a new Soviet proposal regarding armaments and atomic weapons in this session of the General Assembly.

The USSR in 1948 rejected a Western proposal for an arms census. Soviet acceptance of inspection appears conditioned on prior agreement to abolition of the use of atomic weapons and to arms limitation. The USSR's attitude toward inspection in the atomic energy negotiations has been that it should be periodic and limited to announced facilities. Tsarapkin's proposal does not appear to provide for atomic energy control.

25X1A



## USSR

2. Comment on Bolshevik Revolution Anniversary speech:

Politburo member L. P. Beriya's keynote address on the occasion of the 34th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution appears designed to emphasize to the world the USSR's increased economic and military strength in comparison with the rearming West, while claiming the continued existence of a "basis for agreement" with the West.

However, Beriya warned Western leaders not to construe the USSR's desires for peace as a sign of weakness, repeatedly recalled the Nazi invaders' defeat by the Soviet Union at a time when it was much less prepared than at present, and stated that another world war would result in the destruction of capitalism.

To emphasize Soviet strength in basic war industries, Beriya gave absolute figures rather than percentages for the 1951 increases in steel, coal and oil production, and total steel production was hailed as roughly equal to that of Great Britain, France, Belgium and Sweden combined. Although not specifically mentioning the recent atomic explosions in the USSR, Beriya who reputedly heads the Soviet atomic energy program, did not mention the recent atomic explosions in the USSR, but he drew particularly marked applause when he stated that the army and navy "possess all modern types of weapons."

Treatment of the Korean war, which received significantly little attention in comparison to Bulganin's address on this occasion last year, seemed to indicate the Kremlin's desire to disassociate itself from this conflict if not to achieve an actual cease-fire. While Bulganin had drawn a parallel between the situation at that time and the early reverses of the Bolsheviks in the civil war period, Beriya, without mentioning Chinese assistance, was simply "convinced that the brave Korean people will find a worthy way out of the bloody conflict."

- 4 -

25X1A

SOUTH ASIA

4. Comment on political developments in Kashmir:

The recently elected permanent President of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, Ghulam Saddiq, is reputedly one of the two leading Communists in Kashmir. Long an important adviser in Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah's government, Saddiq is now in a favorable position to increase his power and influence.

Under Saddiq's guidance, the Constituent Assembly may be expected to uphold Sheikh Abdullah's recent statement that, except in foreign affairs, the people of Kashmir have full freedom to draft a constitution according to their own desires. The Assembly may act on the Sheikh's suggestion that Kashmir cooperate with India but retain its sovereignty as a state.

India has publicly advocated the establishment of the Assembly and has championed the right of the Kashmiris to decide their own

- 5 -

25X1A

fate, which India confidently expects to be accession to India. Pending a final solution of the problem by the United Nations, India might experience some embarrassment if it prevented the Kashmiris from assuming a considerable degree of autonomy.

If the Abdullah government continues its Communist-tinged policies and if Kashmir becomes a semi-autonomous state, Communist capabilities for obtaining control of the Himalayan borderlands adjacent to India and Pakistan will be materially improved.

25X1



- 6 -

25X1A



## WESTERN EUROPE

6. Belgian and Dutch troop commitments for Korea not likely to be increased:

25X1A

Belgium and the Netherlands have expressed regret at their inability to furnish additional troops for Korea. A Belgian official mentioned the problem of ordering conscripts abroad.

A Dutch Foreign Office spokesman stated that the volunteer system and the lack of incentives has even made replacements for the original contingent difficult to obtain. The Dutch spokesman added that about 2,000 Amboinese soldiers, well-trained in guerrilla warfare and now in the Netherlands, probably would be willing to be used as a contingent to Korea, but the Indonesian Government has taken a strong stand against such employment.

Comment: To affirm their support of the UN resolution condemning the North Korean aggression, Belgium and the Netherlands each sent a token force of about battalion strength to Korea in the early part of the Korean affair.

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